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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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JEAJ.~ W. JEPPSON, his wife,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,)
)
)

vs.

)

UNITED TELEVISION, INC., aka
KTVX T . V.
CHANNEL 4 ,

Case No.
15318

)
)
)
)

Defendant and RESPONDENT. )
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal from the order of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge

GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR.
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN
a;;d

Eli.~S

J:ii)

j(.~.p---

3

·1d·

"~~~ :;;~~Ci~~, ~~~~

84101

- '"Tnc-'NE\:S
RESPONDENT
Sponsored byF<;R
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE --------------------------------------- 1
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

------------------------------ 1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ---------------------------------- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------- 5
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED FAIL TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.----------------------------------- 5
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT, IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ERRED IN NOT
HEARING THE FACTS AND ISSUES ON THE UTAH PENAL
STATUTES SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION, AS WELL AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION.----------------------------- 12
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------- 17

AUTHORITIES CITED

FCC RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECTION 73.1206 --------------- 4,5,7,

14 ALR 2nd, 755 ------------------------------------------ 7
38 AM JUR 2nd Pages 3-72---------------------------------- 17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

76-9-402

':"':ah

C~C.e

76-9-405

::ta_~

Code A!:.::.. o tat. eC '

:;_353

76-9-406

Wta:1.

Code

.~~;i.ota-i:.ed,

::_;;53

""6-4-8

'Jtah Code :;..-:;:ota ted, l953

76-9-401

(2)

.;.::..."lo tat ed, ::_333 '

'

'
'

3.S

_~..r:i..en:ie-=.------4

-

.~enied------

;,

-=>

as A..-:-::::e rrC. ed
3.S

~-::-:-_e:i.ded

::"tab. Code .:;.'1r.otated, l353, as .:..':1..-::e'.'.i::<: --

CASES CITED
S::nit.'l -;. Closs,
~loelker

?::-oelic'."'.

7.

251 _;la 25'.J;

T:;-"ndal.l,

7 • .;dair,

37 So.

2 6 6 ::;.C.. 4 3; - S
2::_3 Kan.

357;

Donahc.e ""t. war:ier Bros.Pictures
2 UT 2nd 2 5 6;

27 2 ? .

2::;.d 113 ----------~;.

E.

2:::. :

~~

-----

516 :?.2:-:d ?33 ------~is~~ibu-:2.::g

:::=;.

2r.C. :;_ 7 7 ---------------------- ·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:'F'.E SC?RL.'1E COGRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JE??SON and
JE??SCN, his -Nife,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,)
)
)
)

-:s.
:..:;-.:~EJ

r-:.~(

:'ELE,.,-ISION,
:'. ·J~.

I~C

I

aka

Case No.

)
)

Cha:inel 4 ,

15318

)

Jefendant and Respondent.

)
)

APPELLANTS

I

BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs sought damages and a restraining order
=.;:i.:.::st Jefendanc: for invasion of privacy in connection
·..,-:-:_:-_ :ele_:;'.-,one conversations going out over the air by
:el2:::si.::::. -.,-:.-:::1:Juc: ?laintiffs' knowledge or permission.
iJISPOSI~ION

:efe:::.a::t filed a

~

~otion

LCWER COURT

to dismiss Plaintiffs'

::=;:.=.:::-:, =.:::. af:er arg-urnent and written memorandums were
o.:.:::-:-:-:e:. ::::- ::o-..:::se:.,

=-:::.

:'.:dge Dean E. Conder granted Defendants'

:::-:'.e.::-e-:. a :.:.s::i.issal a.: Plaintiffs'

complaint.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the District Cou:::
order of dismissal and to have the case remanded for a :.
hearing on the merits and issues set forth in the comp!::
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 11, 1977, Plaintiffs filed a complaint:
Defendant in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Sta:.
Utah, and the complaint alleges three causes of action.
first cause of action deals with the question of invasic·
the right of privacy under the civil law as a tort.

The

cause of action goes to The Utah Penal Statutes dealing·,
the abuse of the right of privacy and the injunctive rel:
exemplary damages and right to attorney's fees involved:
The third cause of action refers to the question of men::
suffering, shock and fright as a result of Defendants'

0:

The complaint sets forth essentially the following facts:
On the afternoon of March 2, 1977, Plaintiffs':
rang at their house.

Plaintiff, Jean W. Jeppson, answe:

phone and a man's voice asked her if this was the Jew·
dence, and Mrs. Jeppson responded that it was.
stated,
set on?"

Then t;'

"This is Dialing for Dollars, do you have you:
Plaintiff responded, "No, I don't."

Then tti

who was an agent and employee of Defendant television_,:
said, "oh, that is unfortunate,

(with considerable en{

because you could have won $50.00."

Mrs. Jeppson

"well now I'll tell you, I'd rather have peace i:l
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t;,,

all that garbage on television, even for $50.00."

The man

laughed and then Mrs. Jeppson said, "Thank you for calling."
Thereafter Plaintiff hung up the phone.
Within moments after this conversation took place
Plaintiffs'

phone began ringing and continued to do so the

rest of the afternoon and into the evening with all kinds of
callers using rude, abusive, obscene, threatening and harassing language toward Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs were shocked,

frightened, upset, embarassed, humiliated, and considerably
concerned about their safety and welfare for days thereafter
because of these many weird and crank calls, all resulting
from the conversation between Plaintiff and Defendants' employee going over the television and air throughout the state
and perhaps elsewhere.
Defendants' employee and agent, while on the air, and
in view of television watchers, recited aloud Plaintiffs'
telephone number, gave out the Plaintiffs' name, possibly
their address, and carried out the conversation with Mrs.
Jeppson without informing her that it was heard and being
carried on television.

The facts, if allowed to be presented

in a court hearing, would further show that Mrs. Jeppson had
never before heard of the "Dialing for Dollars" television
program, had never watched it, and had absolutely no idea that
her telephone comments and conversation was being broadcast
and televised throughout the state.

-3-
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---l
I
I

Plaintiffs' complaint further sets forth the a·
a d1·
tional facts, which must be admitted by Defendant fo

r PUr:·

'I

of this appeal, that the acts of Defendant complained Oi.; ·,,.
in conducting its trade and advertising for its progr~,
"Dialing for Dollars."
Furthermore, Defendant is a duly licensed televis.
station and subject to the rules and regulations
Communications Commission.

oft~~

'··1

That amoung the rules and regiJ.

tions promulgated by the FCC is Section 73.1206

"~

of Telephone Conversations," which states in essence that
licensee shall inform any party to a telephone call of th:
licensee's intention to broadcast the conversation before.
is in fact broadcast.
After Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this ca:
and before any answer to said complaint was submitted, co;:
for Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on:
grounds that it did not state a claim upon which relief er
granted.

Thereafter argument was heard by the court on tr'

motion and memorandums submitted by the parties.
The Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge of the Distri:
Court, ruled in favor of Defendant on the matter and gran:
the motion to dismiss, concluding that the Court recogniz:.
the existence of the law of privacy but that under the fac
alleged, P1aintiffs did not have a cause of action.

-4-
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-It is from the trial courts' granting of Defendants'
motion to dismiss that this appeal is taken.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED FAIL TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION.
The Honorable Dean E. Conder set forth certain facts
and conclusions in his memorandum decision in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss (R 22-23.)

Judge Conder stated

in Pertinent Part:
"Defendant conducts a well known program
known as "Dialing for Dollars" in which they
select random names from the telephone book
and call the number." - - - - - "The conversation is simultaneously broadcast
over the T.V. station - - - - - "
"This Court recognizes the existence of the law
of privacy but concludes that under the facts
as alleged Plaintiffs fail to state a cause of
action - - - - -- - - "the Court concludes that
by having a person's name and telephone number
listed in the telephone book, the person invites
others to call. The real problem here is whether
or not the broadcasting of the conversation over
the T.V. was an invasion of the right.
Plaintiffs
cite the FCC Regulation 73.1206 requiring the caller
to advise the listener that the conversation is
being broadcast. An exception is provided where it
states that 'such party is aware, or may be presumed:
to be aware from the circumstances of the conversation, that it is being or likely to be broadcast.'
The Court feels that this case comes under the
exception."

-5-
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I
I

I

In as much as the trial court granted Defendants·
motion to dismiss the complaint before any evidence was pr;·
sented or the facts fully developed, it is obvious that a:;
the facts stated in the complaint must be admitted or cons::
in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.

The lower cour:

ther recognized the existence of the law of privacy, and we
assume that Judge Conder had in mind not only the Utah Pena:
Statutes involved, but also the civil law as a Tort.
It is hoped that the Utah Supreme Court in this a::
will lend further light and direction on this question, an:
we refer the court to both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' rnemc::
dums for some of the other references, citations, and argur;
involved.

(R. 12-21 and R. 24-29.)
Judge Conder seems to be saying here that even tr.:

the right of privacy in the civil law as a Tort exists, he:
does not believe the fact situation in this case is strong "1
to come within the framework of the right.

We believe that

Court's conclusion on the latter question is in error.
In the first place, the lower court is assuming t:
the T. V. program, "Dialing for Dollars," is such a well knc:,.
program that everyone that may be called may be aware that:
telephone conversation is going out over the air.

we belie

· h ou t taking
this to be a wrong assumption, especially wit
evidence.

The facts of the complaint show Mrs. Jeppson

a~

a::·'

watch television, and a further development of the facts we.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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show she had no idea what that program was or what they did.
Furthermore, simply because a person may list his name
and phone number in a telephone directory, does this give the
right or open the door to record the conversation on a tape
recorder and then publish this recording to the world, or, as
in this case, to broadcast the conversation over the air to the
world?

We think not.

Such action is an invasion of this

natural law of the right of privacy and protected by the constitution.
In 14 ALR 2nd, 755 we read:
"Modern life with its accompanying increase in public
media of communication, such as newspapers, monthl~l
and weekly magazines, moving pictures, radio and
television, has created novel situations that in turn
gave rise to the problem of protecting the individual
who desires seclusion and freedom from intrusion into
his private life as well as from undo and undesirable
publicity.----"
"Concluding that the right of privacy was supported
by logic and the weight of authority the court in,
Smith vs. Doss at 251 Ala 250; 37 So. 2nd 118, said
that it was defined as the right of a person to be
free from unwarranted publicity or the unwarranted
appropriation or exploitation of personality, the
publicizing of one's private affairs with which the
public had no legitimate concern, or the wrongful
intrusion into one's private activities in such
manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities."
"The right has been said to have its foundation in
natural law and guaranteed by both the Federal and
State Constitutions, so that as between man and man
it must be respected."
(See Voelker vs. Tyndall,
226 Ind.
43; 75 N.E. 2nd 548)"
Judge Conder also intimates in his decision that if
Defendant had been in direct violation of the FCC Regulation
1

'~:•s. of 'ldvising the listener that his conversation was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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being broadcast,
rule,)

(and not coming within the e xception

~:

perhaps the facts would be strong enough to sus:: ·

a cause of action for invasion of the right of privac"
l•

It is our contention that the lower court erred::
it's interpretation of the regulation in concluding tha:.
case comes within the exception stated.
The FCC Regulation 73.1206 Conversations"

(ed 8/76) -

"Broadcast of Telep:

is set forth as follows:

"Before recording a telephone conversation :c:
broadcast, or broadcasting such a conversation si:.
ltaneously with its occurrence, a licensee shall
inform any party to the call of the licensee's in·
tention to broadcast the conversation, except whe:•
such party is aware, or may be presumed to be awa;•
from the circumstances of the conversation, that::
is being or likely will be broadcast. Such awarer.:
is presumed to exist only when the other party tc
the call is associated with the statilDn (such as
employee or part-time reporter) , or where the ot;;s:
party originates the call and it is obvious that:
is in connection with a program in which the stat·
customarily broadcasts telephone conversations."
The

exception to the rule takes effect only wher:

other party is aware, or may be presumed to be aware of t:ie
broadcast.

The presumption of awareness exists only where:·

other party to the call is associated with the station or wr'
the other party originates the call.
It is obvious from the Plaintiffs' complaint thal ·
Jeppson was not aware that her conversation was being broacc
and that she was never so informed.

It is also obvious t:ia:

·
d wit
· h one stati' on nor did the:
Plaintiffs were not associate
originate the call.

.

The conduct of Defendant in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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b

ro

adcas'.l

Mrs. Jeppson's conversation and comments over the air without
first informing her that it was being broadcast is in direct
violation of the FCC Regulations.
Now we submit that the very purpose of the Regulation
is to protect and insure the public in their right of privacy.
Counsel for Defendant, in his memorandum,

(R.20) refers

to the fact that there was nothing indecent, vulgar, obscene,
etc. in the telephone call to Mrs. Jeppson from Defendants'
employee.

It was, at worst, only an annoyance, such as telephone

surveys, sales solicitations, charitable contributions, wrong
numbers and the like.

This is true, and it is not the call to

Plaintiffs from Defendant that is offensive and objectionable,
but it is the publication and broadcasting to the worl.d the conversation without first informing Mrs. Jeppson what was taking
place, which resulted in blackening her name and reputation
among some of the public and her friends, and further causing
Plaintiffs great embarassment and humiliation as well as emotional
unrest, shock and fright.
One's choice of words and comments have got to be
different and more carefully guarded in public than in private,
especially over the air.

Each individual is entitled to that

choice, and when they are deprived or deceived in some way, the
results, as in this case, may be highly offensive to the individual and an invasion of his privacy.

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

It is amazing to counsel for Plaintiffs that the:'.
so many people out in the world who would be listening toa
gram like "Dialing for Dollars" and write down or memoriz,.
name and phone number of the person being called so as to;.
a call themselves within a matter of seconds to such a
make rude, obscene, vulgar and threatening comments.

ho~.e

Ther:

be many weird and irresponsible people out there, and Defe:.:
as a licensed television station, dealing with the public,,
do, has to be aware and familiar with this fact.

Therefore,,

is a much greater duty upon Defendant to adhere strictly t:
rules and regulations of the profession by which they are

::1

Counsel for Defendant refers to Prosser, Harper:·
and the Restatement of Torts (R. 19-20) to note that "it '.s
every invasion of a privacy interest that is actionable" a:.
that "liability exists only if the Defendant's conduct was
that he should have realized that it would be offensive to:'
of ordinary sensibilities."
We submit, however, that with the high profess1o::
duty Defendant was under and with the rules and regulatio:'
governing the broadcasting and publishing of telephone cc:.
sations, Defendant is obligated to adhere to, and then to:
cast conversations of an unsuspecting individual without::
informing her of that fact is such conduct that Defendant·
aware, or should be aware, that such intrusion into he!,:
affairs is or would be offensive.

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

In the case of Froelich vs. Adair, 213 Kan. 357; 516
p. 2nd 993, the Court said:

"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his
private affairs or concerns is subject to liability
to the other for invasion of his privacy if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
man. Neither publication nor malice is an essential
element of the cause of action."
The lower court no doubt felt that the broadcasting of
the conversation with Mrs. Jeppson over the air was not so
offensive that it was an intrusion or invasion of privacy,
but it appears to counsel that at the very least the question
of whether or not the intrusion would be offensive to a reasonable man should be a question of fact for a jury after a
development of all the facts, and it should not have been
ruled on as a matter of law.
We submit, therefore, that the lower court erred in
granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint
on the grounds that the facts alleged failed to state a cause
of action.

-11-
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POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT, IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ERRED IN NOT
HEARING THE FACTS AND ISSUES ON THE UTAH PENAL
STATUTES SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION, AS WELL AS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION.

Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action sets forth a·;:
lation by Defendant of the applicable Utah Penal Statutes,
"offenses against privacy," and we refer particularly to
Title 76-9-402,

76-9-405, and 76-9-406, Utah Code Annota:

Utah Session Laws of 1973, as amended.
Judge Conder did not refer, in his memorandum dee:
to these statutes and we must conclude that he determine~
a matter of law that they do not apply in this case. It:
our contention that the statutes do apply and that there·,
a violation of the same by Defendant for which relief shcc
have been granted.
Again, for purposes of this appeal, the facts set
in Plaintiffs' complaint must be deemed as correct or ait:
The complaint sets forth the facts in paragraphs 5, 6,

1
':

(R. 3-4) to the effect that Defendant in contacting Plaint:
in its "Dialing for Dollars" program was doing so for our:
.
h , b oadcastin:
of advertising or purposes of trade in t eir r
·

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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business and used Plaintiffs' name without first obtaining
Plaintiffs' consent.
statute 76-9-405,

Now, this comes directly within the

"abuse of personal identity."

The

statute reads as follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of abuse of personal identity
if, for the purpose of advertising any articles of
merchandise for purposes of trade or for any other
advertising purposes, he uses the name, picture, or
portrait of any individual or uses the name or picture
of any public institution of this state, the official
title of any public officer of this state, or of any
person who is living, without first having obtained
the written consent of the person, or, if the person
be a minor, the written consent of his parent or
guardian, or, if the person is dead, without the
written consent of his heirs or personal representatives.

Counsel for Defendant, in his memorandum (R-18), argues that
the phrase, "for the purpose of advertising any articles of
merchandise for purposes of trade or for any other advertising
purposes," is limited to the advertisement of merchandise and
the promotion of the sale of collateral items.
We submit that this limitation is a wrong interpretation
of the statute.

If it were limited to advertising articles of

merchandise for purposes of trade only, it would be redundant
to add the phrase "for any other advertising purposes," because

-13-
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T
its already been said.

The legislative intent has to;,:

the use of a person's name, without his consent,for an····
---..L.:;,

advertising purposes,

in addition to, "for purpose of•:

tising articles of merchandise in trade."
We believe the case of Donahue V. Warner Bros. ?:
Distributing Corp., 2 Ut 2d

256, 272 P. 2nd 177, inter:·

ting the former Utah Statute, Section 76 - 4-8

U.C.A.,L

where the phrase "for advertising purposes or for

pm~~

trade" was used does not restrict the advertisement
sale of collateral items.
enacted as 76 -

9 -

to~·

Furthermore, i f the new stat:.

405 were meant to restrict the adver:.

ment to the promotion or sale of collateral items, what:.•
would there be in adding the phrase "or for any other ai
tising purposes"?
Furthermore, it cannot be assumed at this stage:
proceeding, that Defendant in conducting its "Dialing'.::
Dollars" program did not promote the sale of merchandis 0
collateral items, and the setting forth of the advertis:·
and trade aspect in Plaintiffs' complaint brings the ~a::
squarely within the statute, as Plaintiffs' name, numbe:
conversation was used without their consent in the fur::·.
promotion, and advertising aspect of Defendants' own bu:.

-14-
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pa

Section 76-9-406 of the Code sets forth the injunctive
relief and damages in these privacy offenses:
"Any person, or the heirs of any deceased person, who
has been injured by a violation of this part may
bring an action against the person who committed
the violation.
If in the action the court finds
the defendant is violating or has violated any of
the provisions of this part, it shall enjoin the
defendant from a continuance thereof.
It shall
not be necessary that actual damages to the
plaintiffs be alleged or proved, but if damages
are alleged and proved, the plaintiff in the action
shall be entitled to recover from the defendant
the actual damages, if any, sustained in addition
to injunctive relief. A finding that the defendant
is in violation of this part shall entitle the
plaintiff to reasonable attorney's fees. Exemplary
damages may be awarded where the violation is found
to be malicious."
Plaintiffs seek relief under the above statute for
the violation and abuse by Defendant of their personal
identity, and the lower court was in error in not hearing
evidence as to damages and reasonable attorney's fees and in
not granting injunctive relief.
Counsel for Plaintiffs also feel that Defendant in
this case, has violated Subsection (a) and (c) of Title 769-402 of the Code, which states:
"(l) A person is guilty of privacy violation if,
except as authorized by law, he:
(a)
Trespasses on property with intent to
subject anyone to eavesdropping or other surveillance in a private place; or
(c)
Installs or uses outside of a private place
any device for hearing, recording, amplifying, or
broadcasting sounds originating in the place which
would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible
outside, without the consent of the person or persons
entitled to privacy there."

-15-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

When Defendant broadc_,t the conver,ation of

PICT

over the air wilhO'U.t~ telling Mrs. Jeppson and in violati::
the F. C. C. Regulations, it was in fact an eavesdropping,
a trespass into her private living room of a conversatic:,
was not meant for public dissemination.
Title 76-9-401 ( 2) of the Code covers the defini:
of 'eavesdropping,'

It st.ates:

"(2)
'Eavesdrop' means to overhear, record, a.nm.
or transmit any part of a wire or oral cornmunic~·
of others without the consent of at least one oa::
thereto by means of any electronic, mechanical~ c:
other device."

Also, when Defendant broadcast the conversation,,
Jeppson, originating in her home, by means of the use o'..'
broadcasting facilities, without her consent it appears;
counsel that this, too, comes squarely within the privac:
violation of Title 76-9-402

(c) of the statute above ref::

to.
Now, it is true, as Judge Conder mentions (R-221,
this is an unusual and interesting case, and we can find
precedence under the fact situation, but had there been:
brutal beating, attack or other type disaster result frc:
this conversation being broadcast, there is little doubt
counsel' s mind that the court would have found a case fJ:
privacy violation.

The principle, however, is the same,

and the privacy of Plaintiffs' home and conversation

tr,i:',

was violated in the same manner as though a recording ;,
had been placed in the home and then later broadcast P'':
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As to Plaintiffs' third cause of action set forth in
the complaint, the lower court did not comment on and
apparently overlooked its possible significance.
The third cause of action sets forth a claim for
severe emotional and mental distress and suffering and shock
and fright as a result of Defendants' wrongful act.

This is

a separate claim from the law of privacy or the statutes on
privacy.
The general law is set forth in 38 Am Jur 2nd Pages
3-72, under fright, shock and mental disturbance, and the
complaint at least sets forth a cause of action on this theory.
The lower court has, therefore, erred in not hearing
the facts and issues involved in Plaintiffs' second and third
causes of action set forth in the complaint.

CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs' complaint adequately sets forth facts
sufficient to state a cause of action involving the right of
privacy, both under the civil law and the Utah privacy statutes,
as well as a case under the theory of fright, shock and mental
disturbance, and the order of dismissal granted by the lower
court should be reversed and the case remanded for a full
hearing.
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r
DATED THIS 16th day of September 1977.

Respectfully Submitted,

GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
2188 Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84i>

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of Septe.:
1977, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Bri:'
Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid to Mr. Ray R. q
Attorney for Respondent,
Utah,

900 Kearns Building, Salt Lakq

84101.
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